The Oral Talmud

Episode 64: Showing Their Hand with Menachem Fisch

Episode Summary

“ I'm always asked, 'You're obviously an anti-traditionalist, so why are you going back to the Talmud all the time?' An anti-traditionalist doesn't need an authoritative history. The answer is that the only way to begin to convince traditionalists of an anti-traditionalist option is to show them that there's a long tradition of anti-traditionalists.” - Menachem Fisch

Episode Notes

“ I'm always asked, 'You're obviously an anti-traditionalist, so why are you going back to the Talmud all the time?' An anti-traditionalist doesn't need an authoritative history. The answer is that the only way to begin to convince traditionalists of an anti-traditionalist option is to show them that there's a long tradition of anti-traditionalists.” - Menachem Fisch

Welcome to The Oral Talmud, our weekly deep dive chevruta study partnership, discovering how voices of the Talmud from 1500 years ago can help us rethink Judaism today. 

Does the Talmud preserve tradition or secretly rewrite it? In this episode, Benay and Dan welcome back professor Menachem Fisch for a conversation that overturns the way many people read one of the Talmud's most famous texts. What looks like a debate about human dignity becomes a masterclass in how the rabbis hid their boldest innovations in plain sight.

As the conversation unfolds, the focus shifts from what the Talmud says to how it says it. Why does the text laugh at a crucial moment? Why does it leave certain contradictions unresolved? And what if the Talmud's deepest message isn't a legal ruling at all, but an invitation to question, reinterpret, and even challenge inherited tradition? If you've ever wondered how a religious tradition can evolve without abandoning itself, this conversation is a fascinating place to begin.

Menachem Fisch is the Joseph and Ceil Mazer Professor of History and Philosophy of Science Emeritus, and Director of the Center for Religious and Interreligious Studies at Tel Aviv University. He has published many books including Rational Rabbis: Science and Talmudic Culture.

This week’s text: Berakhot 19b

Find an edited transcript and full show notes (references and further reading) on The Oral Talmud webpage for this episode! Access the Sefaria Source Sheet to explore key Talmud texts and find the original video of our discussion. The Oral Talmud is a co-production of Judaism Unbound and SVARA: A Traditionally Radical Yeshiva. If you’re enjoying this podcast, please help us keep both fabulous Jewish organizations going with a one-time or monthly tax-deductible donation at oraltalmud.com. You can find a donate button on the top right corner of the website.

Episode Transcription

DAN LIBENSON: This is The Oral Talmud - Episode 64: Showing Their Hand

Welcome to the Oral Talmud, a co-production of Judaism Unbound and SVARA: A Traditionally Radical Yeshiva. I’m Dan Libenson…

BENAY LAPPE: …and I’m Benay Lappe.

DAN LIBENSON: The Oral Talmud is our weekly deep dive study partnership, in which we try to figure out how voices from the Talmud – voices from 1500 to 2000 years ago – can help us think in new ways about Judaism today. 

Does the Talmud preserve tradition—or secretly rewrite it? In this episode, We welcome back professor Menachem Fisch for a conversation that overturns the way many people read one of the Talmud's most famous texts. What looks like a debate about human dignity becomes a masterclass in how the rabbis hid their boldest innovations in plain sight.

As the conversation unfolds, the focus shifts from what the Talmud says to how it says it. Why does the text laugh at a crucial moment? Why does it leave certain contradictions unresolved? And what if the Talmud's deepest message isn't a legal ruling at all, but an invitation to question, reinterpret, and even challenge inherited tradition? If you've ever wondered how a religious tradition can evolve without abandoning itself, this conversation is a fascinating place to begin.

Menachem Fisch is the Joseph and Ceil Mazer Professor of History and Philosophy of Science Emeritus, and Director of the Center for Religious and Interreligious Studies at Tel Aviv University. He has published many books including Rational Rabbis: Science and Talmudic Culture.

Every episode of The Oral Talmud has a number of resources to support your learning and to share with your own study partners! If you’re using a podcast app to listen, you’ll find these links in our show notes: First, to a Source Sheet on Sefaria, where you can find pretty much any Jewish text in the original and in translation – there we excerpt the core Talmud texts we discuss and share a link to the original video of our learning.

In the show notes of your podcast app, you’ll also find a link to this episode on The Oral Talmud’s website, where we post an edited transcript, and where you can make a donation to keep the show going, if you feel so moved. On both the Sefaria Source Sheet and The Oral Talmud website.

And now, The Oral Talmud…

DAN LIBENSON: Welcome back everybody to this week's episode of The Oral Talmud. I'm Dan Leventon, and I'm here as always with Benay Latty. But not as always, we are back here again with Professor Menachem Fisch, which we're very excited about. He was our guest a number of months ago, and, uh, we're really excited to have him back.

And we're doing a little bit of a rewind on our, um, topic today because we've already started a new topic, but we're returning to our previous topic for just this conversation, which is the text at Tractate Berakhot 19B. Remember, that was the text where we were exploring this question of when and to what extent does human dignity override laws in the Torah or Rabbinic laws, and that was part of a larger conversation about what are these new values, including saving of human life and things like that, that the rabbis have introduced at various points that are not found in the Torah, and that end up overriding laws of the Torah.

That, and, and we, uh, look at this text, uh, Tractate Berakhot 19B, which is about the question of, of human dignity. So, uh, so I'll just say briefly just to remind you that Menachem Fisch is the Joseph and Selme Mazur Professor Emeritus of History and Philosophy of Science at Tel Aviv University, where he's also the Director of the Center for Religious and Interreligious Studies, and he's the author of a book we talked about last time called Rational Rabbis, and also the author of a number of articles, uh, about the Talmud, uh, and specifically one about this text, which, uh, I, I think just to, you know, uh, break the fourth wall a little bit and, uh, our process here is that sometimes Benay and I are, uh, learning our way through a text that we don't know as well.

And, uh, then all of a sudden we remember or find an article that we didn't know about or read many years ago and forgot about, and that, that's what happened here, and we realized that actually, uh, Professor Fisch has done a lot more thinking on this than, than we have. And since he's become a friend of ours, we should have him back on the show.

So Benay, I'm gonna turn it over to you at this point just to, just, just, just to start this conversation because you, you've been most recently deep into this article. And I want to welcome you back, Menachem Fisch. Welcome, welcome back to being with us. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Hi. Delighted to be back. 

BENAY LAPPE: We're so, so thrilled to have you back.

Um, I should say that you and I have never had the chance to learn in person, but, uh, your writing has been so, um, influential in my own thinking. Um, I definitely consider you one of my primary teachers, and it's just such an honor to be able to talk with you again. So, so l- let us... Well, I wanna tell you how we got to this text, and what we'd like you to help us with.

So as Dan said, we were following a chain of texts that were, that seemed to be dealing with the establishment of broad, new foundational principles that the rabbis were inserting into the tradition. And when we got to a certain text, it, it just reminded me of another text that I had learned only in its sort of punchline, or what I thought was its punchline.

It was like a slogan for me, but an amazing slogan. And that was the text from Berakhot 19B that said, "So great is our concern for human dignity that it overrides every commandment in the Torah, even every negative commandment in the Torah." In other words, if someone's dignity might be harmed by obeying the Torah, even a prohibition which is an even, uh, m- more stringent kind of Toratic command, we should rather prioritize their dignity, and we should violate the Torah.

And there are n- no s- exceptions even given the way there are over, you know, in Sanhedrin when the rabbis say, "So great is the concern for life that we should violate any law in the Torah to preserve life," but with three exceptions. Here, there are no exceptions at all. It's an enormous principle. And as a queer person who's very attuned to how we injure the dignity of human beings by holding up the Torah and saying, "I'm sorry, you know, this is what it says," uh, you know, w- you know.

This slogan remained a very important text for me. And when Dan and I decided to learn it together, we backed up to where the text started. And as we were learning through it- We, we were tripping over the,

um, we're tripping over the text, and I could sense something weird is going on here. Something is odd. Um, and w- and we kept being disappointed. I was disappointed over and over that the text seemed to not uphold this radical and gorgeous value. It seemed to keep knocking it down, and I didn't want it to do that, but I knew something was going on.

Then I remembered that you had written about it, and I finally went back and read what you wrote, and I realized, ah, we were onto something, that we were tripping over it in confusion. Um, but still not yet quite able to grasp what's really going on here. And that's why we're, we, we have you here today, and I'm so excited that for you, this is, I think, and tell me if I'm wrong, kind of the paradigmatic text that demonstrates the most radical agenda of the Talmud, or perhaps the Talmud's agenda broadly.

And I introduced last week's text, HaChovel, by saying, "For me, this is the paradigmatic text," and I love that this is that for you. And we would just love to hear how you read this text and what you think is going on. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay. Uh, this is such a pleasure, uh, to be invited back to, to deal with this particular sugya.

Um, it's not merely the paradigmatic sugya for me. I mean, what I try to argue is that, that it's, it's the showcase sugya for the Hillelite redactors of the Bavli. And, and let, let me start from, from, from the, uh, from the very last line of my presentation, just to, just to, um- Uh, uh, you know, to counter that feeling of discomfort.

Um, the, the, the, the principle stated by Rav Yehuda in the name of his teacher Rav, both Amoraic sages, is that it's exactly the opposite. It's exactly the opposite. In other words, um, uh, whenever, uh, uh, Hillul Hashem or, or, or not doing your religious duty overrides everything, including, including the dignity of your rabbi, okay.

And, and the example brought is if you find, God forbid, kilayim, mixed kinds, in your robe, and we have to remember nobody wore underwear in those days. You're supposed to strip it e- even in the middle of the street. So, so in other words, your-- for your own dignity, for the dignity of others, and by the way, it also applies if you find, if you find mixed, um, uh, uh, um, mixed kinds in the robe of your rabbi.

You're supposed to strip your rabbi naked, right? And, and, and not even wait to do that duty, um, until you get home or in, into an archway or something. So, so this is a very, very zealous position in terms of, um, of the, that human dignity, uh, is not supposed to play any role when, uh, you know, duty, your, your religious duty, uh, negative or positive, is in the way of it.

Okay. Now, where what you call the gorgeous principle of how great is human dignity that it overrides every single, uh, uh, um, precept of the Torah is- is hoisted up against Rav. This is a classical question. It, it, what the stam is doing is objection. means objection, right? Mm-hmm. Objection. Here's a Tannaitic text ruling which says exactly the opposite of what you sa- you're saying So they answer that the Tannaitic text is really talking not about every negative pre- precept of the Torah, but one specific one.

And that is that you should always listen to the rabbis. So if it's a rabbinic precept, okay, you know, that, that... But, but a Torah, a Torah mitzvah can never be overridden by dignity. In other words, what, what the answer is trying to do is not to say that, that, uh, right, the Tannaim thought so, but Rav thinks differently.

And therefore, Halakha is now reformed. But what, what he's doing, and this is what the Talmud does day in, day out, is to reinterpret the Tannaitic text radically in a way that really robs it of its, of its clear meaning. Okay. Oh- In order to bring it in line with Rav. Now, why am I, why am I starting here?

Because the very next line in the sugya is that in the Beit Midrash, they laughed at that.

Th- this zealot's opinion attributed to Rav who, who, as we know, there's a long tradition that he has Tannaic authority. So therefore, he, he could have said, you know, "Well, I think differently." No. He states, he s- he states the zealot's position which, which is Shammai in, uh, the, not, not that Rav himself, uh, historically or, or within the rest of the corpus is a Shammai.

But he's presented here as upholding a Shammai position, okay, of total, um, faithfulness to what the Torah teaches us or to what we received from our rabbis, so the Halakhic tradition. And yet that very position, as we shall see in a moment, is, is, is a radical reform of what we have from the Tannaic tradition.

And that one baraita is, is, is one prime but not only prime example. 

BENAY LAPPE: Okay. So, so let me back up a minute. Um, one thing I want to get out on the table is part of the discomfort or what's strange on the surface of this text is that the... A- any reader of the Talmud should be coming to the text knowing the rules of the game.

And one of the rules of the game is that in earlier, a Tannaic teaching- When it is thrown against or raised in opposition to a later Amoraic teaching, everyone knows the rules of the game are the Tannaitic teaching wins. That is, an Amoraic position can never win out over an earlier Tannaitic position.

So the, what's- So what's 

MENACHEM FISCH: going on? 

BENAY LAPPE: Right. So, so what's going on? And, and as you write in, in one of your articles, the, the, the cure is always applied to the disease. Meaning, y- you, you- Right ... identify the problem and then you fix the, what you think is the problem. And what gets fixed in our Sugya isn't the later contradicting opinion, but the earlier authoritative opinion- Yeah

that can't be overturned by the later opinion. So why does that happen? 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay. 

BENAY LAPPE: Okay. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Gotcha. Gotcha. So a- as I said, um, uh, I, I, I understand the, the, the project of the Bavli. Okay? And, and the project of the Bavli writ large is how do, how, how does the learned society in the Beit Midrash receive the Torah of its forebears?

Okay? Its forebears, this is classical. Uh, um, the, the Mishnah is a paradigmatic example of how, how Halakha should be passed down to the next generation, and the Bavli treats it as a paradigm of, um, of, of, of handing down Torah. That every single issue that's raised has been decided, not because anyone claims to know God's intentions, but because of the prosaic fact of, of, of, of, uh, majority vote.

Okay? The Chachamim think, which means the majority have decided so and so and so and so. And, and, uh, in, in- A vast majority of cases in the both Mishnah and the Tosefta, they immediately go on to record minority voices who disagree, but who have been overrided. And therefore, in, in, in, in, in that absolutely broad, yet systematic and very, very detailed body of law recorded in the Mishnah and the Tosefta and the Tannaim, th- these are passed down and the Bavli receives them.

How does the Bavli receive them? As Hillelites would do. Not as a dictate which ha- an auth- an authoritative di- dictate that has to be obeyed, but as a parliament, any parliament would receive the law book of, of, of a former generation as a topic to be discussed and re-evaluated, and so on and so forth. And the Amoraim discussion of the Mishnah, um, is very much like the Midrash.

You get this opinion and that opinion and that opinion of what the Mishnah means and how, how it's going, and then there, the, the, the... There's a very, very intense dialogical exchange between them, and all these various takes on Mishnaic law then get enriched by that dialogue and no adjudication is made.

So in other words, the Bavli doesn't produce a new Mishnah. But, uh, and in that sense, I think it's Hillelite through and through. But in order to, uh, in- to be inclusive of, of the Shammaite, of the more zealous traditionalist positions so that they can all live happily within this, uh, um, uh, uh, Talmudic framework and talk to each other and argue to each other without controlling each other, the, the, the Hillelite reformative position has to tone down its rhetoric radically.

Now, one way of doing that is what you described before. The classical Meitivi sugya, and there are, there are thousands of them. The, the word Meitivi, the objection, you can find something like 850, but, but each one, like in our sugya, is followed by Tashma, Tashma, Tashma. There is sort of follow-up moves. So if you count all of them, it, it...

I've, I've never actually counted all of them, but, but, but, but, but there are thousands. Thousands of cases in which an Amora, a later authority, is on record saying the law in this case is A, and it's a general statement of law. Meitivi, objection, that's the word, and the very next word is not A, and usually in Hebrew.

In other words, a, a, a... It- The the stam doesn't explain himself. He, what, what, what he does is he s- kind of slaps the Amora with this Tannaic source which says exactly the opposite. 

BENAY LAPPE: Uh-huh. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay. Now, in tw- in 25 cases, 24 or 25 cases, the next line is, In other words, this is a, a, th- th- this is a refutation of the Amoraim position and the Amora res- A- and that, 

BENAY LAPPE: and that's what you'd expect.

MENACHEM FISCH: That's what you'd expect. 

BENAY LAPPE: Okay. 

MENACHEM FISCH: And in minute... I mean, this is, this is 25 cases out of thousands. 

BENAY LAPPE: Ah. 

MENACHEM FISCH: In all the other cases, the next move is that the Amora will explain away or interpret away in, in, with, with such a, a, a far-fetched interpretation which is unbelievable. Yeah, of course, but the, what the Mishnah is talking about, the Tannaic source is talking about is not the general case, but they're talking about a very, very specific case in which I would agree that it's right.

But, but so this is, now, this is an interpretation of the Tannaic position which totally maintains and even confirms the Amoraim later position by stating not a general law which contradicts him, but a, but, but, but a particular, uh, uh, very, very far-fetched case in which despite the fact that the Tannaic text is now read as, as acknowledging and, and, and endorsing the Amoraim position, e- even the Amora will agree that that would be the case in that.

Okay. Now, the end product is a radical reform of Tannaic Halakha, but the rhetoric is one of- Uh-huh, 

BENAY LAPPE: uh-huh ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: interpretation. Okay? Now, a, a true traditionalist would never go that way because if, if, if, if, if, certainly not at that percentage of cases, right? I mean, if this is the Tannaic tradition, this is the Tannaic tradition, so I accept it.

And, and if I said the opposite, so, you know, sorry, I, I, I accept. I, I, I didn't realize that, that this was the case. And, and that's it. That's what a traditionalist would do Okay. But, but

traditionalists also have to interpret their, their, their, their legacies just like j- just like everybody else before they decide what to do with them. But in the traditionalist case, once he's o- once he's arrived at an understanding of the Tannaitic text, this, this will be his position. This has to be his position.

So what the Hillelites are doing in a very, very sly way are speaking a traditionalist language, yet, yet interpreting, you know, lost in interpretation. That's what the movie was called, right? I mean, Lost in Translation, I think. 

BENAY LAPPE: Right. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Th- this is lost in interpretation. And, and in a very, very radical way, and in an enormous percentage of, of, of the cases.

Okay? So, so now- As, as very, very, very many. I mean, I, I'm tempted to say all. People who study at the yeshiva Talmud, traditional Talmud learners, they're so used to this that they don't, they don't even give it a second thought. And, and, and, and, and, and the sort of the, the, the, the Orthodox rhetoric is that, yeah, the Amorah had a tradition that this is what, this is what the Tannaitic text means, and everyone's a good traditionalist.

Mm-hmm. Now, the beauty of this sugya is that it's giving away the game by little gestures like that, like that chuckle, like that, you know, little peal of laughter, which w- but, but, but on a, on a grander scale. So, so let me back up a little and, and, and, and I, I know you've studied this text, but, but to, to give it, you know, to give the topography, um, of it a, a little credit.

The Mishnah starts off by saying that a person whose dead lies before him. In other words, what, what we call an onan in Halakha. Someone, um, someone who's mourning a close relative, not allowed to mourn yet. I mean, the, the, the, the, the deceased hasn't been buried yet. You only, you only start the, um- Um, uh, you, you, you, you, you only start the, uh, the mourning process after the burial.

Before the burial, uh, you're supposed to sit with the deceased, uh, until, until the funeral begins. And what the Mishnah says is that during that period, the mourner is exempt, um, from every... from, from the Shema and from, and, and from the tefillah, and from tefillin, and from every other precept of the Torah.

It doesn't mean you can, you know, it doesn't mean you can eat pork. Um, it, it... We're, we're talking about negative pres- precepts of the Torah. But, now, Rashi, Rashi realizes that, that this sugya might get him into trouble. So he says that what the, the principle at work is, ha- asok b'mitzvah patur min ha-mitzvah.

In other words, since, since you're caring for the dead, um, you know, the, the... keep your other religious obligations on hold. But the principle there is that if you can do both at once, okay, like, like take care of the dead and, and say the Shema at the same time, you can do so. And the Tos- Tosafot point out that this is not the case here.

You're not allowed to put your tefillin on. You're not allowed to say the Shema. You're supposed... I mean, I've, I've got my own personal take on that is, is that while the deceased is, is not buried, you play dead out of empathy with- Wow ... the dead person, okay? Wow. And you, you, you, you, you're, you're obligated to empty your, your own life from all religious content.

Okay? So there's a real principle at work, which is to do with empathy and dignity. This is what kavod ha-met I think really means. And then the whole process of, of, of the mourning is to, is to kind of bring you back into the community, back from the dead, and in the same, at the same time, uh, revitalizing the f- the full memory of the deceased in, you know, in, in, in, in the shiva But then the, then the Mishnah goes on to say that not only is the mourner exempt, but during the funeral itself, all active participants, those who are taking, you know, those who are carrying the bier, is that what it's called in English?

BENAY LAPPE: I don't know. I've only read this word and I've never heard it pronounced. The- Ah, 

MENACHEM FISCH: okay ... I- I'm 

BENAY LAPPE: not sure. I 

MENACHEM FISCH: think, I think it's bier. I think it's bier, 

BENAY LAPPE: yeah. Bier? Okay. Bier. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay. So those, so those carrying and those who are supposed to replace the carriers, ev- everyone who has an active role in the funeral is also exempt.

Okay? And, and, a- and, and then the very next one... So this is the di- this is out of Kavod HaMet. The, according to Tosfot and it's absolutely clear from the remainder of the sugya that although the Mishnah doesn't say this explicitly, this is the way the Talmud understands the Mishnah, as saying. Okay. As being about the dignity of the dead, and the fact that that dignity, you know, that, that, that, that, um, care for dignity of the dead overrides everything else.

But just, just before you jump, Benet- Yeah ... then, then the Mishnah goes on to say that after the burial- Okay. When, when the mourners form two lines, um, uh, sorry, when, when, when the people who come to the funeral, uh, attending the funeral form the two lines and the mourner works... And, and, and, and now they're lenachem, now they're, they're comforting.

This is the first act of comforting.

They're still exempt. Yeah. They're still exempt of all, of, of, of, you know, all, all demands of the Torah. And now it's not the dignity of the dead, it's the dignity of the mourner. Okay? So there's a shift there which, which kind of, of calls to build what you call the gorgeous principle of, of, um, you know, considerations of dignity in general for all people and in different circumstances override.

And this is what the Sugya will arrive at at the Tannaitic level. Okay? And, and, and, and then there's another beraita that comes up and that... And, and, and this is the kickoff for, for 19B, for the, for the actual Sugya, where, where, uh, it says, "Our rabbis taught and the rows that can see inside are exempt, and those that cannot see inside are not exempt."

In other words, those who are in the immediate proximity of the mourner, they are exempt. And, uh, and then a wonderful line which says, "Those who came to the funeral, um, uh, in, in order to, to, to comfort the mourner, they are exempt. Those who came to the funeral for their own dignity," you know, especially if someone im- important is being buried, so you need...

They're not exempt. Okay, so, so, you know, that, that... It's quoted from the Tosefta. That beraita which is quoted by the Bavli is, is, um, is very, very clear about the fact that, that when it comes to funerals, considerations of dignity sort of spill over from the diseased to the mourner, and, and they affect everybody, uh, uh, actively involved.

And then out of the blue- 

BENAY LAPPE: Okay. Well, let me, let me just summarize what we have here, because this is important, and this is something that I missed. Dan got this, which is what is the Mishnah saying? The reason why one is, um, obligated to do certain mourning rituals rather than other mit- Torah mitzvot that they would be obligated to perform, to fill in, so on, prayer and so on I thought maybe was simply because one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah.

But that misses the import of this Mishnah. Without saying so explicitly, what you're saying is the Mishnah's here to tell you we have... What we're passing down in the Mishnah, in this Tannaitic authoritative position is human dignity overrides all other concerns. Yeah. Not only dignity for the dead- Yeah

but dignity for li- That's what the Mishnah's saying. That's what then triggers the Gemara, the more- Yeah ... Gemara's discussion of that principle. But I, but, but- Okay. I think Dan was real clear about that ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: I'm saying more than that. I'm saying more than that. Okay. I'm saying that this is the way the Sugya understands what the Mishnah is saying.

Uh-huh. Because between 19B and the Mishnah, we certainly get this, this, um, uh, uh, this wonderful saying, um, in which when you go, when you walk through a cemetery, keep your tzitzit in. Don't let them hang out. Why? Because, because the dead are, are totally improvished, okay, of, uh, uh, of religious, of, of religious life.

So don't mock them by sort of flaunting your, your tzitzit. And- 

BENAY LAPPE: Uh-huh ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: th- this, this is dignity. Okay? And, and it's not... Now, now why is this so important? Because all the rituals to do with burial are rabbinic They're rabbinic. Th- these aren't, this isn't tefillin. You know, they're not Torah persons like tefillin, like the Shema, uh, uh, and like tfillah.

They're not midoraita, they're midrabbinan. Totally midrabbinan. But these derabbinan duties override the oraita duties because of the dig- because of the dignity aspect which is involved. That's what I, that's what I'm saying. I- I'm not saying this is what the Mishnah says. I... God knows what the Mishnah says.

This is the way the Talmud more than implies, understands what the Mishnah is saying, because the entire Sevi'i is about dignity. Mm-hmm. Okay? The entire Sevi'i is teasing out, uh, or, or discussing this principle. But at the same time, it's a showcase of, of, of... Let me say it. It's, it's, it's a showcase of, of the way in which the Hillelites, despite toning down and despite disguising their radical reform moves as, um, you know, as interpretations, as Shammai moves, they're giving away the game.

Okay? Now, so suddenly at... And, and, you know, this is the great turning point. Enter Amar of Yehuda, Amar Rav in the name of Rav. If one discovers mi- mixed kinds in his garment, he should strip it off, even in... I, I translate it in the street, but it says Bashuk, you know, in the middle of the marketplace. What is the reason?

And a ver- a verse from Proverbs, "There is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord." Against the law. Wherever a profanation of God's name is involved, no respect of, is paid even to the teacher. I, I added an even there. Okay? So, so in, in other words, uh, um, eh, this is exactly the opposite principle of the Mishnah, right?

Exactly the o- now, if you've been attentive as a reader of the Sugya to this point, what you'd now expect is, is a question to Rav, what will you do with the Mishnah? The Mishnah says exactly the opposite. And just in case we've forgotten it, because we studied the Mishnah last week and we've only got back to the Sugya this morning, that the, the very line before Rav is that, is that Toseftes, Baraita which, which claims explicitly who is exempt and who isn't exempt, and it's, and, and, and, and it's more than implied that it's because of the dignity of it.

So what's going on here? Now, the beauty of this Sugya is that, that Rav's later Amoraic position is supposedly questioned by a series of these metiv questions, by the soggy rag of a Tannaic position which, you know, whi- which will take the brunt of the Kushiya rather than Rav himself. And, and I'd like to read that bit in a sec, okay, ju- just to get a feel of the rhetoric, which is special here.

But, but what's left unattended to is the fact that Rav at the very same time is not merely Contradicted or seemingly contradicted by these four or five metivie Reitel brought in. But he's contradicting the Mishnah itself, and that's just left hovering. Okay? No excuses made, no interpretations offered.

The Mishnah is sort of far enough away for that tension to linger on. Okay? And what, what... Well, we'll, we'll get to that at the end. And I, I, I don't want to be a, you know, a party pooper regarding what you call the gorgeous principle, right? Um, but, but be- be- because this whole sugya is slightly ironic, uh, in the sense that what is radically taken to be a reform of Halakha is a very, very Shammai traditionalist position.

Um, zealous traditionalist position of Rava. And therefore, the, the, the irony of the showcasing of, of the dynamics of what, what goes on in these transgenerational Halakhic confrontations is even, uh, further exasperated by the fact that in the role of the reformer is is an arch-traditionalist position.

Okay? Um- 

DAN LIBENSON: That, that's actually, that's actually what I wanted to ask you about here because I... You know, this strikes... The way that you're describing this, as I, as I understand it, that what we see here is a, what you call a Hillelite or an anti-traditionalist pr- process going on here. Um, but to achieve a conservative, let's call it, result.

You know, the, in other words, that I often think of the Hillel position as ve-

Both, in the sense it's more willing to play around with the tradition and change things, but also sort of, quote, progressive in the sense that it's, it's, uh, it's, it's substantive objectives tend to be n- you know, nicer. Uh, and, and it, and it's one that you would think, well, Hillel's position would be that human dignity should override any rule in the Torah.

Uh, and Hillel also would be inclined to, um, you know, kind of, uh, get rid of a, an, a, a Tannaic, uh, a Mishnah-level teaching that, that they didn't like. Uh, but here we see the anti-traditionalist process to achieve a, a conservative, quote, quotations, conservative result. By the way, we see this all the time. Y- a lot of times we make comparisons to, uh, the Ameri- Anglo-American legal system, and we see all the time that, you know, progressives can use, uh, constitutional originalism, which is generally seen as a conservative p- procedural move, and conservatives can use all kinds of, uh, procedures that tend to be generally used by progressives if they want to do something like get rid of the right to abortion or anything like that that they might want to do that's been around for 50 years.

They can use something that they normally condemn to, to get rid of that. But I, I guess I'm, I'm curious if I've got it right in terms of what's going on here as you're describing it, but also can, can you, can you explain or do you have a theory about why 

MENACHEM FISCH: this is going on? Oh, yes. Yes. Yeah, absolutely. I think the main, I mean, the main point of the sugya, which I'll, I, which, which I think I can prove, is that this is so radical that Rav has to be, that Rav's statement has to be re-read as, as radically reformist.

I mean, that little line added which one does not... That if the profana- i- if you think there's a, that the, that we're in danger of pr- of the profanation of God's word, then you don't respect even your rabbi should be read. If you think the Halakha is wrong, you owe your rabbi nothing and you should change it and reform it, which is, which is the, the very principle of anti-traditionalism.

Now, I, I, a- again, I don't know how, how detailed a reading you've given this sugya, but right before, on 19A, okay, on, on, on the page, suddenly out of the blue, someone announces that in 24 places, people have been condemned, uh, Menudim, okay? Been, uh, uh, excommunicated Because of respect for the rabbi. 

BENAY LAPPE: Mm. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay?

Now, what you expect to hear, 24 cases of people who had the chutzpah, right, to disagree with their rav or to, to, to, to, you know, declare them to be mistaken. So there are not 23. There are two or three stories, one of them being... And all of them subtly, I mean, it, it's like that joke about the jokes everybody knew, so they gave them numbers or- Yeah, 

BENAY LAPPE: right.

MENACHEM FISCH: So, so the stories aren't told, you're reminded of them. 

BENAY LAPPE: Uh-huh. 

MENACHEM FISCH: So the advanced student will recognize what they're talking about, and the, and the one who doesn't will say, "Okay, so this is a case of someone who was disrespectful to his rabbi." The first case is, of course, the Oven of Afnai. And, and Rabbi Eliezer there is being too respectful of his rabbis and not willing to acknowledge, um, uh, uh, the Hillelite, um, uh, uh, overhauling or reforming- Uh-huh

of the Halakha. And the second story alluded to is Akavia Ben Mahalalel who does the same thing in, uh, Masekhet Eduyot, who remains faithful to, to Shmaya and Avtalion and wouldn't accept the, um, uh, uh, the overturning of that. And suddenly you realize that, that these people were excommunicated because they were traditional.

Now, in the light of that, now that light is not, doesn't shine onto the, on, onto the Rav statement explicitly. But oh, boy, I mean, it speaks, it, it speaks very loudly implicitly if you know, if you're aware of what's going on. Suddenly we're led into Rav, and what Rav is really saying is if you think wrong has been done to the principles of Halakha, you don't respect even your rabbi.

Okay? Now, that's the statement of anti-traditionalism. It's not about... It, it's not an undermining of what you call the, the, uh, the gorgeous principle of, you know, dignity overriding everything. What he's saying is that dignity can override anything. But not, uh, not to maintain a Halakha which you think is problematic and should be changed merely out of respect for the tradition or for your rabbi.

DAN LIBENSON: Wow. 

MENACHEM FISCH: And therefore... Okay? That, a- and, and then the whole sugya sort of... I mean, and this, th- th- this is why I think it's such a profound sugya. And then there's a little story, two little stories that come after the series of, of the Meitivi questions on Rav. One about a sage who, who made a gross mistake. He thought a woman who was wearing an inappro- inappropriate headgear, um, was Jewish, and he slapped her.

He slapped it off, and it turned out that she was, she was a Babylonian matron, and he was fined, fined a lot of money. In other words... Now, and that's just left hovering. In other words, we're fallible. We can be wrong. Our rabbis can be wrong. The tradition can be wrong. And therefore, the Hillelite principle is always to question, always to be wary, and s- always to criticize.

And then the very next move is where Rav Yehuda says, um, a- again, the Amora Rav Yehuda says, um, "How come, how come when, when, when, the, w- in, in times of, um- In times of draw-- drought, sorry. In times of drought, we can tear our hair out, okay? And we can pray and we can shriek and nothing happens. And all the Tannaim had to do was to take off one shoe, okay?

And, and sit down on the ground, and the rain came pouring down. And yet, and yet we understand Masechet Uktzin, which is suppo- which is supposedly a very, very difficult and complex in so many ways, while they, they, they could never understand it. In other words, we're greater learners than them, okay? We're greater Talmudists.

We know the Halakha better than they are, and so on and so forth, and yet they had this great tzure. And, and, and what they say, it's not about the authority of learning. It's because they're hem masu et nafsham, uh, and so. So they were religiously devoted. Which again, is a way of saying that that doesn't mean that they carry Halakhic authority, because we know Uktzin better than them.

Now, that's, that, that's, that's the presumption of the little question. Now, these two little stories are tagged on at the end. The Akavia Ben Malaleel and, and, uh, and, and, and the Achmai Avan are alluded to at the beginning. And then we get this sort of, um, ironical traditionalist reform, if that's not a contradiction in term.

Supposedly, traditionalist, zealous reform of the Mishnah itself without saying a word about it. But then if you really understand what's going on, boy, take a second look about, uh, at what Rav is actually saying. He's fi- the first and foremost of the Amoraic sages who are in this Hillelite game, and what he's saying is, is even respect for your teachers shouldn't stop you doing what you think is right in Halakha.

And then this everything kind of falls into space. And then you take a second look and nothing of what I've just said, nothing, is said explicitly. It's all alluded, hinted to by the, by, by the structure of the Sugiha, by the dynamics of it and any uninitiated. Right. And there are two types of readers who'll never get it, right?

And purposefully. The, the, the beginners- That's fine. And diehard traditionalists, diehard traditionalists will, will just read it the way, you know, the way you read it. But, but for the, uh, for the highly attuned Hillelite, this is a very, very radical... Now, the very last thing I want to say is if you look, we won't do this, but if, if you look at the Meitivi Seviyo, okay, against the Rav principle, they're slowed down.

I mean, we're now watching the Olympic Games. They're, they're like, they're like slow, uh, um, replays. And, and the way it's set out is Rav says what he says, right? Meitivi. Meitivi. Uh, um, if the mourner after the funeral, after the two lines, is making his way back out of the cemetery, okay, and there are two roads to take.

One through the graves, which is impure, right, and the, and the priests can't take, and one which is pure And, and what the Baraita says that even if he chooses in his, you know, muddled grieving frame of mind, if he chooses the, the impure way, all will go with him, including the priests, because of dignity of the mourner.

So then the Talmud asks, it, it, it has declared meitivi, right? Objection. And you think that the yellow card now is pointed at Rav. But then after quoting that, that Baraita, the, the, the Gemara goes on to say, "Why is that? Why doesn't, why doesn't the Baraita rule She'ein chochma ve'ein tifunah ve'ein keneged Hashem," and so on and so forth, stating Rav's position Now, this is not done in Meitivi Sugiah.

Meitivi Sugiah, as, as you yourself said, the, the, the, the knock on the head is from Tannaitic to Amoraim, right? From, from earlier to later. And here they're doing the same. Meitivi, an objection against Rav, and then the question is asked, and the question is asked on the, on the Baraita. 

BENAY LAPPE: Right. 

MENACHEM FISCH: And the answer comes that the Baraita is really talking not about an impure redhe, but a safeck, a beit apras where someone found, once found a little bone and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, and it's only a rabbinic sort of gedel.

And therefore, and therefore, you know, d- dignity of the mourner can override that, but not real grave. Right? And, and the sort of the classical. And then comes the next one, and then comes the third one, which is your gorgeous principle, which is totally general, saying that kavod overrides everything. And, and, uh, and, and then the answer in the name of Rav.

Rav isn't the one speaking. It's always someone like Uzziah. Um, the answer is then, well, this is really talking about the Torah's insistence that we should al- always listen to the rabbis, which is about, therefore about rabbinic, but- Right ... and then simply bursts out laughing. And that is left to Havah, right.

Okay. So, so, you know, this mixture of irony, structure, relevant stories that come to bear which, which all bespeak the exact opposite, A, of what Rav is saying, and B, of the sort of traditionalist, uh, rhetoric of, of dealing with, uh, Meitivi Sugiah. And the fact that the, the contradiction of the Mishnah isn't even raised, it's just left to Havah.

I think that here is the Hillelite, the, the Hillelite redactors of the Talmud, uh, for once giving away their game without saying anything. And that's why I, I simply adore this sugya. 

BENAY LAPPE: Amazing. Okay, I wanna ask you a question. I f- I feel s- I feel stupid asking it because I feel a little bit like the person in the joke who said to Mrs.

Lincoln, uh, you know, "Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?" Is like, this question is going to reveal that everything you said- Yeah ... it has... Okay, here's my question And I, I realized that I was so attached to this beautiful principle that I was reading the Sugya with sort of a Halakhic lens. What's the Halakha?

Does it end up on this beautiful principle or not? And therefore missed kind of the meta message of it. But yet I kind of still have the question. Does the Sugya end up, uh, conveying the idea that this gorgeous principle about dignity isn't really... It doesn't survive or does it survive in the insinuation of the process by which we would resuscitate it?

You, you know what I'm saying? Yeah. Like, does, does that gorgeous principle go away? Is that the Halakha? I know that I'm reading the Gemara for the wrong reason here. But I'm still, I'm still wondering what, like, what ha- what happened to the patient? 

MENACHEM FISCH: Yeah. Well, look, um, if, if we can agree, um, on the principle that, that the Babylonian Sugya in, in general is a kind of Hillelite undertaking, then don't look for dictates.

BENAY LAPPE: Yeah. Mm-hmm. 

MENACHEM FISCH: You... A- and, and the, y- nowhere in this Sugya do we get a summary saying, "Okay, after all is said is do- and done, on the question of dignity, A, B, C, and D." Now, how, how, how the later Halakhic and, and, and, and, you know, Musar literature treat it is a different question completely. 

BENAY LAPPE: Mm-hmm. 

MENACHEM FISCH: But I, I think- 

BENAY LAPPE: Mm-hmm.

MENACHEM FISCH: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm ... that the, that, that, that moment, embarrassing moment of undermining the gorgeous principle is laughed at- 

BENAY LAPPE: Yeah ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: in the Sugya. Really, uh, um, it is, is, is... Now, laughing at something or, or being ironical about something, um, isn't, isn't a Psak, and don't look for a Psak. And certainly don't look for a Psak in a, in, in a Sugya which is exemp- wh- which is trying to exemplify the fact that what you're supposed to do and I'm supposed to do is to take the Sugya and criticize it if we think, you know, it's running against, um- And yet, and I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm always asked, and I think I mentioned this in, in, in, in our earlier session.

Uh, I'm always asked, "You're obviously an anti-traditionalist, so why are you going back, uh, uh, to the Talmud all the time?" I mean, an, an anti-traditionalist doesn't need an authoritative history. And the answer is, I think, that the only way to begin to convince traditionalists of an anti-traditionalist option at least, is to show them that there's a long tradition of anti-traditionalism.

And I think that, that the fact that the, the sort of the radical reformative move which is hit, okay, by the gorgeous principle, but that, but the way it's dealt with is then smiled or laughed or chuckled at, so, you know, um, is, is attributed to n- no one less than Rav, uh, who is attributed the most zealous traditionalist position at face value.

I think it, uh, I think it really means exactly the opposite. But, um, it seemingly, okay, and, uh, and, and by doing that, going against the very Mishnah, is, is almost too ironical for irony. It, it, the, the, there's- S- as, as you actually open, something is going on in this Sugyah which is way, way, way, uh, sort of beneath the, the, the, the, the seemingly, uh, simple surface of the rhetoric.

I think it, uh, I mean, I, I'm, I may be over-interpreting, I may be do- You know, maybe I'm performing an Okimta on, on, on this very Sugyah, but it, it's, I think it's absolutely profound. Yeah. And, and, and subtle and complex and deep and gorgeous, was the word that you used, right? 

BENAY LAPPE: Yeah. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Okay. 

BENAY LAPPE: Amazing. Amazing. 

DAN LIBENSON: I, I think we're probably, uh, out of time, but I, I just, I just wanna share, I mean, if you wanna, if you have something to add about it, feel free.

We can go a little long. But I, I just like, when I'm listening to you, I'm actually thinking back to the Yeah.

You know, and,

and we can kind of make a nod that we're not actually... So I don't know what you think about that, but, but that was- Um- Yeah

MENACHEM FISCH: Yeah. I mean, we, we, we, we, we, we can let that... We, we, we can let that stand. Um, but the, the... I think what the s- the, the Sevi'i sort of is a real undermining of the zealot's pr- position precisely by subtly putting the zealot in, in- 

BENAY LAPPE: Yeah ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: the reformative- 

BENAY LAPPE: Yeah ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: um, uh, in the reformative position. Tanu Rasha Lakamai, uh, the way I now read it is, um, is, is, is about, is about getting into trouble because of the heavens, because of the «‎Eilu v'eilu divrei Elohim hayyim» behalahot kehilchata.

And, and sort of this, this simplistic idea that you can have a, a, a pluralist, um, forum which is run in Hillelite fashion. No traditionalist will accept a Hillelite ruling against one of his traditions, and that's exactly what happens with Rabbi Eliezer. And everybody realizes the mess they've got themselves into because of Eruvin 13B, because of that vatikal, that it...

That, that the only road open to contain minimal violence is, is to forcefully sep- re-separate the forces. But of course, now, now that E- Eliezer's Torah has been attacked and he views it... I mean, the, the zealot in him, um, uh, uh, sort of reacts violently and Rabban Gamaliel gets killed. I mean, it's a very, very vicious, vicious ending, but it's contained in the sense that the violence is kept to a minimum.

From now on, Rabbi Eliezer goes back to Lod, to his town, and he'll conduct his affairs there as he sees fit, and we won't try to rule him, he won't try to rule us. Um, and, and, and we can live together within a to- with- within... between the covers of a book, but not, you know, uh, with us running the Sanhedrin.

The very idea of Sanhedrin, of a, of a central halakhic authority has exploded by, by Tanu Rasha Lakamai in favor of a diversified, um, diversified authority 

BENAY LAPPE: I, I'm fa- I know, I know we're a little over time, but I just wanna get this out on the table. And, and to reference something you said before we began recording, which tell me if I've, I've got you right, that, that multi-vocal, non-violent conversation that can't actually live in real life lives...

The, the Gemara becomes a kind of, um, I don't know, pseudo space where that c- that kind of conversation can happen, or it models it for how it might be, uh, right? I- it's a, it's a reality that lives in the text that- 

MENACHEM FISCH: Yeah. I'm, I, I, I, I, I'd say a little more than that, that the Talmud can be a canonical text for both communities- Mm-hmm

precisely because it's not, it's not adjudicating- 

BENAY LAPPE: Uh-huh ... 

MENACHEM FISCH: at the Halakhic level or the meta-Halakhic level. And that each there has its voice and, and is enriched by the challenge of the other, but without, without any one of them controlling each other. I mean, th- this, I think, is... I mean, th- this is a whole different talk, but, but, um, I think Rawlsian political liberalism is, is that kind of framework where the state realizes there's a plurality of communities, each with a different notion of the good with a...

And, and the state steps back and does not take, uh, any position on that except for justice, except for, you know, um, um- Except for, for giving everyone-- e-except for dealing with equality and, uh, and, and liberty. And the liberty is to live the life as you see fit. 

BENAY LAPPE: Okay? 

MENACHEM FISCH: The, the extra step, I mean, in, in, in political philosophy stuff I'm writing, the extra step is to take-- is, is what the b- what, what you gain by living within, uh, within the Talmud is the enriching experience of the challenge of somebody else with, with, with, without feeling, um, you know, without having to be defensive and without anyone trying to control the other.

So th-there's a very nice political analog between the conception of, of, of, of the Babylonian Talmud not being a manifestation of Yavneh, but b-building on the ruins of Yavneh, a radically different conception than «אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חלוקים והלכה כבית הלל». No. Halakha like nobody. Everyone will make Halakha according to the way they see fit.

But we can get together, um, um, uh, you know-

We can get together without, without being anxious of one another. And I, I think, I think that's wonderful, and enjoying the other's otherness in, in, in that sense. So y- you know, there's an ethics here. There's a political philosophy which can be teased out of it. And, um, and, and, and this Sugiyama sort of has it all, um, in a sense 

BENAY LAPPE: Amazing.

Thank you. Thank you so, so much Thank you both I can't wait to go back and relearn it, um, through your eyes. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Thank you, guys. Thank you so much. 

DAN LIBENSON: Thank you so much, Menachem Fisch, and we look forward to our next opportunity to learn with you. This has been so much fun, and, uh, and we'll see our, our viewers next week.

We'll be back to the text that we studied last week, . Uh, so looking forward to that. See you next week. 

MENACHEM FISCH: Thank you. 

BENAY LAPPE: Thank you so much

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